In Cameroon, like in other African countries such as Ivory Coast or Ghana, the production of oil palm is distributed in 3 sectors: an agro-industrial sector, a village sector controlled by agro-industries, and a small-scale traditional sector.
Even though Indonesia and Malaysia hold a strong leadership position in the oil palm global market, the agro-industrial sector in Cameroon can rely on several advantages.
In the first place, the industrial plantation of oil palms has largely benefited from governmental programmes and from international capital. The intensive culture of oil palm – a plant traditionally used by local populations – begins under the German colonization and is further developed by the French and the British with the creation of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and of Pamol Plantations.
In 1963, the government starts a first large programme aimed at developing the plantation of oil palms, notably with the creation of SOCAPALM in the Kribi region. In 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture launched an ‘oil palm project’ within the framework of new “voluntarist” policies aimed at “modernizing the agriculture”, with the help of France and the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank). This programme is seen as a “national priority” and promotes an increase of production and productivity in order to cover national needs (in deficit) and to improve international competitiveness. The objective is to produce at least 250,000 tons by 2010. This aim relies on the privatisation of large state-owned exploitations (CDC, Palmol and SOCAPALM) and on the increase of the plantation area of at least 5,000 ha per year.
Secondly, the oil palm agro-industry will benefit from the predicted boom of biofuel, a new market in which the French group Bolloré, for a long time present in Cameroon, is expected to play a key role.
In Cameroon, the culture of oil palm and its industrial transformation is carried out by 5 large societies, 3 of which are being owned by Bolloré: SOCAPALM, SAFACAM and the Ferme suisse. The investment strategy of this group is based on the possibility to expand the plantations and on the productivity gains made possible at the level of production and transformation.
Created in 1822, the company of the Bolloré family has today a yearly turn over of more than 5 billions of euros. The Bolloré Empire has specially grown in Africa, where it controls more than 70 firms in 35 countries, particularly in the transport, energy, and other highly profitable sectors such as wood exploitation and cash crops (like oil palm and hevea). It is well-known that the group, in order to expand its influence, did not hesitate to work hands in hands with dubious dictators such as Sassou Nguesso. What is more, Bolloré has largely benefited from the large privatisation campaigns imposed by structural adjustment programmes.
In Cameroon, Bolloré’s nickname is “the last emperor”. The group is present in the petroleum industry (Chad–Cameroon pipeline), in sea transport for exportation and in the wood business. The group also controls about 40,000 ha of oil palm plantations, particularly through the Belgian company Socfinal. The latter, which flourished thanks to the Belgian colonization in Africa, exploits 31,000 ha of oil palms in Cameroon (SOCAPALM and the Ferme suisse), as well as other oil palm plantations in Indonesia and elsewhere in Africa, totalising an area of more than 140,000 ha.
SOCAPALM is the largest oil palm plantation in Cameroon and its expansion is on the way, at the cost of neighbouring forests traditionally used by local populations. SOCAPALM is at the root of important land conflicts involving Bagyeli, Bulu and Fang populations whose land has been confiscated without compensation. Their traditional ways of life have become impossible and at the same time they cannot benefit from an insertion into the market economy.
In effect, SOCAPALM hires workers from other regions of Cameroon and accommodate them in camps located in the plantation. The neighbouring villagers, on the other hand, only rarely get jobs. Jobs are often temporary, without labour contracts, without health and accident insurances, and the wages are extremely low: an unskilled worker earns a little more than one euro a day (the workday starts at 6am and lasts sometimes until 6pm). What is more, the arrival of non-native workers poses several problems, for instance with respect to the increasing pressure on local bush meat.
The agrochemicals used by SOCAPALM and the rejections of its treatment factory massively pollute the neighbouring streams. Cases of sicknesses within the village population have been reported.
An important number of guards prevent the villagers from using the resources of the plantation. This situation led, on January 7, 2003, to a severe clash between guards and villagers (during which arms and legs were cut by machete). As a reprisal, the police forces came to help the plantation guards and swept off many villagers and kept them in jail without trials during 14 days.
Given that oil palm plantations benefit from a large national and international support, this type of agro-industry will keep on spreading, in parallel with a worsening of the mentioned social and ecological impacts. Moreover, the new market of biofuel will certainly represent a powerful motor for the cultivation of oil palm. It is expected that the Bolloré group will not stay inactive in the great race for the “substitution of petroleum”. The group has already several advantages in his hands. Bolloré is already present in the energy and plantation sectors and can benefit from solid foundations in Africa based on the collusion of political and economic interests. Also, eager to green its image, the group has already invested in projects of “alternative” energy, for instance with its “BlueCar” electrical prototype.
By Julien-François Gerber, e-mail: JulienFrancois.Gerber@campus.uab.es. This article is based on the author’s field observation and on the following publications: M.A., Monfort 2005, "Filières oléagineuses africaines", Notes et études économiques, n°23, p. 55-85; Agir ICI & Survie, 2000, "Le silence de la forêt: réseaux, mafias et filière bois au Cameroun", Dossiers Noirs n°14, and "Bolloré: monopoles, services compris. Tentacules africaines", Dossiers Noirs n°15, Paris, L’Harmattan.
