Around the world, more and more women identify themselves as feminists. The growth in feminism in recent years has been accompanied by the capture of the movement by capitalism. In this regard, the number of transnational corporations and organizations like The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Conservation International (CI) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) that incorporate into their activities the discourse of women’s individual “empowerment” and sexual diversity has increased. 

It is more and more common for these organizations to position themselves as organizations responsible for improving women’s living conditions, giving them more opportunities and visibility. Thus, they link women’s freedom to the fact that they take up positions of power within the capitalist logic. Popular feminism starts from the assumption that the emancipation of women will never be complete in a society where the labor of most of the population is appropriated by a capitalist minority; territories of collective use are appropriated by private interests; and much of the population is structurally exploited. This is why feminism must be anti-capitalist, anti-racist and anti-colonial in order to truly serve as a tool of women’s emancipation. We believe in the kind of feminism that places its bets on popular self-organization and builds alliances with other subjects in struggle, walking together towards a horizon of transformation. 

The “colorful” capitalism of transnational corporations and NGOs, on the other hand, does not provide real answers to the problem of the exploitation of women and of peoples all around the world, and does nothing but continue expanding the exploitation of labor and the incorporation of nature into its accumulation process. Their profits increase also on the basis of the exploitation of female labor without any rights. This process of appropriation of feminism is known as ‘purplewashing’: a strategy of appropriation of struggles that serves to improve corporations’ image in the eyes of the public, while at the same time driving a process of commodification and neutralization of the feminist critique of the system. 

This “multicultural neoliberalism with a ‘human face’” is a type of strategy where States and international agencies incorporate “professional” feminist organizations to integrate the gender dimension into their programs. (1) Out of this process there emerge, for example, “gender equality policies”. These are documents that all the large conservationist organizations have, full of good intentions, but devoid of any actual political commitment. It is a shrewd way to de-politicize conflicts and reduce the critique of patriarchal capitalism to questioning the “sexism” present in individual behaviors inside the organizations, thus removing the systemic character of oppression. (2) Within this logic, the (false) solution for gender inequality is on the market, via its “social” projects. In other words, investments in “gender programs” ultimately – and as per usual – have the intent of positively impacting corporations’ profits through the washing of their image. (3)

One example of this is the oil company Chevron, one of the greatest violators of Indigenous People’s rights throughout the globe. It has established a partnership with a feminist fund in Brazil, the ELAS fund, to develop economic entrepreneurship projects with women from local communities (4). This dynamic of corporate funding of feminist actions is a trap. These are strategies that reinforce two kinds of misleading discourse. One is that there is no alternative outside of the business logic, and that working strategically with these partnerships might change corporations’ behavior. Another argument is that it is better that companies invest in women rather than continuing along the same logic of having only male leaders. These are rationales that remain hopeful vis-à-vis the activities of companies and major transnational organizations. However, the systematic violations of communities’ rights all over the world do not let us forget that there is no room for naivety in relation to such actors. The objective of enhancing women’s and communities’ autonomy over their bodies-territories is always incompatible with the intrinsic logic of any capitalist corporation, namely, to continuously amplify its control over ‘natural resources’ and over other people’s labor.

The “gender policies” of big NGOs 

In previous WRM bulletins we have talked about how big conservationist NGOs in practice behave like companies. (5) It is no different in the case of ‘purplewashing’. Like transnational corporations, big NGOs have increasingly placed their bets on selling a feminist image to the world.

This trend may be seen in big conservation NGOs like The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Conservation International (CI) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). It also happens in smaller organizations, such as Solidaridad.

All these organizations have their own “gender policies”, documents where they record their supposed commitments to equality between men and women. Conservation International, for example, states that it builds gender equality by directing the benefits of projects equally to men and women, hence increasing women’s access to and control of resources, and promoting women in leadership roles. A study by this organization about a protected area in the Philippines states that “conservation initiatives too often overlook or insufficiently address the fundamental rights of women to participate in, and benefit from, conservation projects, programs, and policies”. (6) The organization has also created a program in support of female indigenous leaders in countries of the Amazon region, meant to “promote the ideas and actions of Indigenous women to conserve the Amazon and maintain climate stability”. (7)

However, when we analyze the actions of Conservation International in the communities´ territories, we see that its conduct does not strengthen communities by respecting their knowledge and practices. The organization has been accused by the Association of Amerindian Peoples (APA) of disrespecting the territorial rights of Indigenous Peoples in Guyana, owing to its involvement in the creation of a protected area in the south of the country with no consultation of Peoples in the region. (8) In a more recent case in Peru, a project led by Conservation International that is trumpeted as a success story in fact brought about forced evictions, loss of livelihoods, destruction of about ten homes (most on Mothers’ Day) and other impacts on communities. (9) How could it be possible to support local women’s organizations and conduct “feminist” actions without at least respecting peoples’ self-determination over their territory?

Another example: The Nature Conservancy launched its “Women in Climate” initiative, which intends to gather female leaders in efforts against climate change. (10) The webpage of the initiative starts off with a discourse on the importance of women’s political participation and the inclusion of women of all sexual orientations, affirming a “feminist” approach. However, when we reach the program’s strategic plan, we see that the perspective is business as usual: it is based on the goals of the 2030 Agenda – a major failure of the UN system (11) – and reinforces the importance of so-called nature-based solutions, the new name for commodification and financialization of nature and of the commons. (12) 

NGOs may also act towards purplewashing agribusiness. This is the case, for instance, of a project by Dutch-based NGO Solidaridad, which works to ensure traceability and low carbon soybean production in Brazil. Furthermore, it concerns itself with ensuring “female participation” in agribusiness.

One of the initiatives that this NGO supports is the production of Fazenda Laruna, headed by estate owner Claudia Liciane Sulzbach, located in Balsas, Maranhão state. Fazenda Laruna has 1100 hectares of farmland devoted to growing soy, corn and beans. In an interview, the owner stresses her great concern with “good practices” in production, socio-environmental certification and the affirmation of the “strength of women in agriculture”. It is a very explanatory example of combining the “greenwashing” of agribusiness with ‘purplewashing’, which supposedly promotes “women’s empowerment”. It is not a kind of isolated initiative, considering that there is a yearly event in Brazil called “National Congress of Women in Agriculture” where entrepreneurs like Cláudia stand out by telling their stories.

In practice, we know that soybean production is one of the main causes of socio-environmental conflicts in Maranhão, and that “sustainable” and low carbon soybean production is no more than a fairytale. (13) This type of “climate-smart” agriculture perpetuates the same injustices as “classic” agribusiness, maintaining the unjust distribution of land in Brazil, socio-economic inequalities and the power of transnational corporations. 

The experiences of “successful” women in agribusiness are major exceptions and have nothing to do with the experiences of millions of peasant women, rural workers who are mostly black, have no access to land and have to fight incessantly for their right to land and against monoculture soy plantations. (14) 

While so-called “successful women” promote themselves on the back of such initiatives, the overwhelming majority of women continue to suffer the impacts of the destruction of nature and of the exploitation of labor in their territories. Or, as Tica Moreno puts it, corporations’ actions “are aimed at breaking the ‘glass ceiling’, while the vast majority of women are ever more bound to sticky floors, more akin to quicksand”. (15)

Natália Lobo – Sempreviva Feminist Organization (SOF) 

(1) ALVAREZ, Sonia. Neoliberalismos e as trajetórias do feminismo latino-americano. In: MORENO, Renata (ed.). Feminismo, economia e política: debates para a construção da igualdade e autonomia das  mulheres. São Paulo: SOF, 2014.
(2) FARIA, Nalu. Desafios feministas frente à ofensiva neoliberal. Caderno Sempreviva. São Paulo: SOF, 2019.    
(3) MILLER, Julia; ARUTYUNOVA, Angelika; CLARK, Cindy. Actores nuevos, dinero nuevo, diálogos nuevos – un mapeo de las iniciativas recientes para las mujeres y las niñas. Toronto, Awid, 2013.
(4) Idem
(5) https://www.wrm.org.uy/pt/artigos-do-boletim/alem-das-florestas-ongs-conservacionistas-se-transformam-em-empresas
(6) https://www.conservation.org/docs/default-source/publication-pdfs/tabangay-westerman---policy-matters-issue-20.pdf?sfvrsn=1c03f4f4_3
(7) https://www.conservation.org/about/fellowships/women-fellowship-opportunity-for-indigenous-women-leaders-in-environmental-solutions-in-the-amazon
(8) https://www.wrm.org.uy/pt/node/13339
(9) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/forest-communities-alto-mayo-peru-carbon-offsetting-aoe
(10) https://www.nature.org/en-us/what-we-do/our-priorities/tackle-climate-change/climate-change-stories/women-on-climate/
(11) https://www.wrm.org.uy/pt/artigos-do-boletim/a-agenda-das-grandes-ongs-de-conservacao-em-tempos-de-crise
(12) https://www.wrm.org.uy/pt/declaracoes/declaracao-nao-as-solucoes-baseadas-na-natureza
(13) https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2023/12/06/soja-sustentavel-avanca-no-maranhao-para-pesquisadores-conceito-e-conto-de-fadas
(14) https://www.miqcb.org/post/empres%C3%A1rios-da-soja-usam-corrent%C3%A3o-para-desmatar-territ%C3%B3rio-quilombola-no-cerrado-maranhense
(15) MORENO, Tica. Armadilhas do poder corporativo: maquiagem lilás e mercantilização das lutas.  In: MORENO, Renata (ed.). Crítica feminista ao poder corporativo.  São Paulo: SOF – Sempreviva Organização Feminista, 2020.  p. 130-154. 

Large conservationist NGOs have played a major role in turning REDD into the dominant forest policy worldwide. This mechanism was introduced in 2007, and the first wave of REDD projects and programmes was implemented from 2008 to 2013. Some of the promoters of REDD projects included these large NGOs, which benefit from receiving millions in grant money for ‘pilot projects’ and ‘capacity building’, as well as from selling carbon credits on the carbon market.

Evidence from the past two decades has confirmed that the early warnings about carbon offsetting in general, and about REDD in particular, have proven to be true. REDD projects have completely failed in their objective of reducing deforestation, and therefore have failed to mitigate climate change too (2). And yet a second, bigger wave of forest carbon projects and programmes has been underway since 2020, when the Paris Agreement came into effect.  

Sub-national and national REDD programmes have received less attention than private REDD projects. These projects are referred to as “Jurisdictional REDD” or “government REDD”, and they cover a whole province or country. The World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is one of the major promoters of jurisdictional REDD. Its aim is to help countries in the global South get prepared to receive REDD payments, through a Readiness Fund; and then to reward them for reducing deforestation with so-called ‘results-based payments’ through a Carbon Fund.

Since it was launched in 2008, the FCPF has struggled to disburse the funds and to demonstrate results. Furthermore, in places where the FCPF has paid out money, many problems have appeared. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the FCPF supported the PIREDD/Plateaux REDD+ Programme in the province of Mai-Ndombe. This WWF-run programme restricted communities' land use and caused conflicts (3). Problems also appeared in another jurisdictional REDD programme in Zambezia province in Mozambique, where the FCPF fully failed to achieve its main objective: to stop deforestation (4).

And yet, big conservationist NGOs like TNC refer to the FCPF as a “success” (5), not least of all because of the key role they play in such programmes. This is the case of the by FCPF supported East Kalimantan Jurisdictional REDD programme, which is the focus of this article. This programme was approved in 2019 by the World Bank and has run from 2019-2024. It covers the entire province of East Kalimantan, Indonesia. When this article mentions 'programme documentation', this is in reference to the East Kalimantan jurisdictional REDD programme (6).  

The prominent role of NGOs represents a conflict of interest

According to the programme documentation, the Indonesian government initially intended to implement the FCPF's jurisdictional REDD programme in Indonesia in seven districts, located in four different provinces with widespread deforestation: Jambi, Central Sulawesi, Central and East Kalimantan. Two of these seven districts – Berau and West Kutai – are located in East Kalimantan.

Since 2008, TNC and WWF, have been involved with REDD-related activities in Berau and West Kutai. The programme documentation states that TNC and WWF have a “key role” as “implementation partners,” stating that these two organizations' experience offers “opportunities” for a bigger program in the future. The Berau Forest Carbon Program, set up by TNC, is referred to as “the first REDD+ program in Indonesia to span an entire political jurisdiction”, allowing it to “generate lessons for national REDD+ programs”.

The programme documentation also states that one important criterion to receive FCPF funding is the need for additional funding from other donors. While the other districts –  which were part of the original proposal – were not successful in raising these extra funds, TNC ensured USD 50 million to go to Berau, while WWF and its partners ensured “up to US$ 82.5 million” in West Kutai (7).

There was no explanation as to why the decision was made to channel all the FCPF funding – USD 110 million - to East Kalimantan and not to the other provinces. But the strong impression remains that both TNC and WWF had a significant influence, revealing the conflicts of interest at play. For example, both NGOs prepared the ground with their activities in Berau and West Kutai; TNC was one of FCPF's founding members and donors and developed the idea of the FCPF together with the World Bank (8); and WWF participated in elaborating the programme documentation, which should have been the Indonesian government´s responsibility (9). There are additional examples of how these NGOs exercised their influence, which reveal the entrenched conflicts of interest (10).

In November 2022, the Indonesian government received the first advance payment of USD 20.9 million – equivalent to IDR 320 billion – from the World Bank (11). According to a letter from the Provincial government about the distribution of the money, “intermediary institutions” (NGOs, or lembaga perantara in Indonesian) will receive as much as IDR 3,190.914.000 in so-called Performance payments and IDR 19,502.000.000 in Reward payments. These payments amount to IDR 22,692.914.000, or USD 1.482 million – about 7% of the total initial payment of USD 20.9 million. One third of this money is for 'management fees', and two thirds are for 'program/activities' costs (12). If one takes into account the total approved amount of USD 110 million, based on this percentage, NGOs could receive up to USD 7.6 million of FCPF funding.

A programme full of contradictions

A programme focusing on those who do not drive deforestation

The programme documentation claims that the jurisdictional REDD Program in East Kalimantan is “designed to address drivers of deforestation”, and it identifies industrial oil palm plantations (51%), logging (22%) and mining (10%) as the three main drivers. However, as with TNC's pilot project in Berau, most of the Program budget- 53,2% - is focused on “providing alternative livelihood opportunities” to rural communities, including indigenous communities. This is in order to address “deforestation linked to encroachment and agriculture” [excluding oil palm], rather than on the main causes of deforestation: oil palm, logging and mining.

In spite of the programme's stated focus on “alternative livelihood opportunities”, this does not seem to be reflected in the reality on the ground. Three communities in West Kutai district, visited by WRM, JATAM Kaltim and NUGAL Institute in September 2024, complained through their local government representatives that the money they were promised for a project they presented to the programme coordination and which was approved, has not arrived yet. This is almost two years after the Indonesian government received its first payment from the World Bank. According to the villagers, each village was supposed to receive IDR 201,64 million, or about USD 12,938, mentioned too in the aforementioned letter from the provincial government (13).

Local government representatives have made several other complaints. One is related to how people from the REDD programme team came to the community to ask questions and fly a drone around, without explaining their objective or sharing the outcome of their survey. Local representatives have also questioned why each community in West Kutai is receiving the same amount of money, even though the smallest village in West Kutai has an area of 815 ha, whereas the biggest covers 56,957 hectares. This should translate into differential costs when it comes to forest monitoring. However, village size seems to be irrelevant to the programme coordination, which decided that all 82 villages included in the REDD program in West Kutai will receive the exact same amount. The community also complained that they have not been informed, nor consulted, about the REDD programme or about what REDD actually is. Only the community leader was invited for one information-sharing meeting, which took place outside the village territory.

One of the local representatives' complaints in particular stands out. Although the World Bank declares in the documentation that “communities will be able to select the benefits they prefer to access, which will reflect their priorities”, two villages had their community proposals rejected. Their proposal requested the purchase of car to patrol their forest area, which they determined to be a priority. The argument was that cars cannot be allowed because they contribute to global warming. This is quite a hypocritical reply, to put it mildly, for a programme that is built on the logic of generating carbon credits so that polluting industries responsible for the climate chaos can continue to destroy the climate. Meanwhile, the REDD programme penalizes communities that are not responsible for the climate crisis.

A programme ignores one of the main drivers of deforestation, mining

1,434 mining permits as of 2020 cover more than 5 million hectares, or 41% of the province’s territory (14). Mining companies, most of which are coal companies, are some of the biggest drivers of deforestation and other social and environmental violations in East Kalimantan. In the programme documentation, the World Bank expresses concern about the fact that the governor of East Kalimantan who took office in 2009 “campaigned on a platform of support to mining industries”.

However, “Mining companies are not included” in the REDD programme. They “will not implement any ER [Emission reductions] activities” with a footnote in the programme documentation, justifying the exclusion of mining on a governor's decision from 2018 that “suspends new coal mining permits, and adds additional requirements for companies who want to extend their permits”.

First, the argument that no new mining permissions will be given out is simply not true. For example, PT Adaro Energy, Indonesia's 2nd largest coal company, benefited from a new concession in 2024 (15). Besides, the governor´s decision from 2018 does little to prevent deforestation in the concessions that were given out before 2018, but are still under development. What's worse, ignoring the mining sector also underestimates the widespread phenomenon of illegal mining in East Kalimantan, which is causing even more destruction and risks than the legalized destruction.
 

Indonesia's mega-project of a new capital: a “manageable” kind of deforestation for the World Bank

Another major contradiction is exemplified in the construction of Indonesia's new capital city (IKN), a mega-project that was launched in 2020 in East Kalimantan. While on the one hand, the World Bank admits this “is likely to affect emissions in the province”, due to deforestation, it also states that the impacts of IKN “appear to be manageable”, arguing that it has the “potential” to “green” and “reforest” the area. The USD 30 billion IKN project has been particularly promoted by ex-president Jokowi, who wants to transform it into his main legacy.  

What the World Bank considers to be “manageable” shows the complete ignorance of this multilateral institution, both about the scale of this mega-project (which increased in area from 180,000 to 256,000 hectares following its launch in 2020), as well as the social and environmental violations against the Balik indigenous people – whose territory overlaps with the capital construction site. Furthermore, there will be other, more devastating indirect impacts related to the construction of the new capital, which the World Bank is ignoring (16).

A programme that claims to have “results” even with deforestation on the rise

In order for jurisdictional REDD programmes to set a target for reduced deforestation, they first  set a baseline; this involves defining a period of years over which the average annual rate of deforestation and forest degradation is calculated. In the case of the World Bank supported REDD programme in East Kalimantan, this period is 2007-2016. During this period, 700,800 hectares of forest cover was lost – or about 5.5% of the entire province. The next step is to set an emissions reduction target for the programme period (2019-2024), based on the average deforestation rate from the baseline period. In the case of the East Kalimantan REDD programme, the emissions reduction target set is 27%. This modus operandi raises at least two questions: What is the reasoning behind choosing one baseline period over another? And who makes these choices?

In the programme documentation, the first baseline period chosen was 2006-2015. However, in the final project document of 2019, this period was changed to 2007-2016. This seemingly small modification meant a significant change, because the new baseline period included the year 2016. This was a peak year in forest loss in Indonesia and East Kalimantan; massive forest fires hit Indonesia in 2015 but were only fully accounted for in the 2016 figures, due to a lack of image data of the 2015 destruction (see graph 1 below).

Image

 

While the programme developers provided no justification for changing the baseline period, it is obvious that the new baseline makes it easier for the REDD programme to achieve “results”.  Moreover, the deforestation rate in East Kalimantan reduced in the years after 2016, due to state policies as a reaction to the forest fires from 2015 that caused severe impacts. According to the REDD programme documentation, it was because of a national moratorium on primary forest clearance for plantations and logging.

Another consequence of the 'generous' baseline is that even though deforestation increased in the province, almost doubling from 79,200 hectares in 2022, to 161,000 hectares in 2023, the provincial government can still claim it has achieved “results”, as the graph above shows. This increased deforestation was due to the expansion of oil palm plantations, among other activities. (17)

Those who define the baseline and programme targets are the very same actors who are most interested in ensuring “results”, and therefore their own payments from the programme. These actors include the World Bank, the East Kalimantan government, TNC, and WWF.

Jurisdictional REDD also promotes carbon trading

Environmental and social organisations tend to critique private REDD projects much more than jurisdictional REDD programmes, also in Indonesia (18). One reason is probably due to the erroneous perception that carbon trading, the main critique of private REDD projects, is not involved in jurisdictional REDD programmes. Yet jurisdictional REDD programmes follow the same logic of focusing on carbon, carbon accounting and carbon trading – just like any other REDD project. And like other REDD projects, these programmes also use the same manipulation wherein project proponents themselves define baseline scenarios and 'results'.

In the case of the FCPF, most of the money has come from governments, such as Norway, Germany and the UK. But since this project's inception, there has also been money coming from private entities, such as TNC and the oil company, BP, which expect to receive carbon credits in return (19).

In recent years, carbon trading seems to play an ever-increasing role in the FCPF's functioning. Since 2018, the FCPF has engaged with CORSIA, the aviation sector's offsetting scheme. According to the World Bank, this scheme “is expected to offset more than 2 billion tons of CO2”. In 2023, the FCPF became eligible to supply CORSIA with carbon credits. By the end of 2023, the FCPF started to offer carbon credits for sale on the carbon market (20). In the latest update on the East Kalimantan FCPF programme on the World Bank's website, the programme is categorized as 'CORSIA eligible', meaning that East Kalimantan's REDD programme will allow the aviation industry to grow, whilst claiming it is not damaging the climate.

Final considerations

This article points to a number of contradictions in the jurisdictional REDD programme in East Kalimantan, based on the erroneous assumption that REDD is actually about reducing deforestation. REDD is not about stopping deforestation, but about creating more business opportunities for extractive industries and business-oriented conservationist NGOs, like TNC and WWF – all while increasing the threats to forests and forest-dependent communities.

Working under that assumption, what is written in most of the programme documentation makes much more sense. For example, the World Bank describes East Kalimantan as a province “rich in natural resources, such as timber, oil, gas, and productive soils”. Through such a lens, it makes perfect sense to exclude the mining sector from the scope of this programme, and to downplay the main drivers of deforestation, –logging and oil palm –  by promoting certification schemes that have only helped expand these destructive monocultures. (21)

Understanding REDD as a policy that threatens forests also helps to better understand why there is a focus on the activities of people who are not a threat: forest-dependent communities. The World Bank describes them as “poor” in East Kalimantan – in contrast to the “rich” natural resources. The rural people, such as the Dayak communities, are particularly poor, states the World Bank. And the FCPF is creating new threats for their livelihoods. With NGOs like TNC and WWF involved as “implementing partners”, the focus is on creating more protected areas, without people. Never mind the fact that the World Bank and its business-friendly REDD programme does not hinder the threat of further mining, logging and oil palm expansion.

To provide a picture of what can really be expected from the REDD programme in East Kalimantan, let us quote once more from the programme documentation – this time from a rare passage of clarity amidst the blurred vision of the World Bank: “Expanding agriculture, logging, mineral extraction, urbanization and housing development have resulted in not only increased land conversion, but also forest degradation, reducing environmental benefits which further exacerbate poverty”.

NUGAL Institute, JATAM Kaltim and WRM International Secretariat

 For security reasons, the names of the people who gave their testimonies for this article and the names of their communities are preserved

(1) See for example in https://www.ykan.or.id/content/dam/tnc/nature/en/documents/ykan/laporan-kuartal-dan-tahunan-ykan/YKAN-Annual-Report_EN_.pdf, and also in https://www.undp.org/indonesia/press-releases/south-south-exchange-sse-2024-indonesia-leads-example-redd-knowledge-exchange
(2) News about ´fake credits´ and fraudulent practices are increasingly widespread. Additionally, projects imposed restrictions on the lives of forest-dependent communities that were already taking care of the forest. 
(3) https://www.wrm.org.uy/15-years-of-redd-PIREDD-Plateaux-REDD-Project-DRC-Conflicts-Complaint-Mechanism
(4) https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/world-bank-funded-zambezia-integration
(5) https://www.ykan.or.id/content/dam/tnc/nature/en/documents/ykan/laporan-kuartal-dan-tahunan-ykan/YKAN-Annual-Report_EN_.pdf
(6) The programme documentation consists of a confusing set of documents that all have similar content, including the first 'readiness preparation proposal', presented to the FCPF in 2009, and approved in 2011; the first draft of Indonesia's jurisdictional REDD program presented in 2014 ; and the final proposal based on this initial draft that focuses on East Kalimantan: the East Kalimantan Jurisdictional Emission Reduction Program (EK-JERP), which was approved in 2019 and covered the entire province. The EK-JERP claims it will achieve 22 million tonnes of “verified CO2 emission reductions” from 2019-2024. In exchange, the World Bank has committed to paying an amount of up to USD 110 million, against a fixed price of USD 5 per tonne of CO2, based on a Benefit-Sharing Plan that was formulated by the Indonesian and East Kalimantan governments.
(7) TNC succeeded in raising funds from the governments of Germany (KfW/GIZ/FORCLIME), Australia, Norway, USA (a debt-for-nature swap scheme) and from charities like Ann Ray Charitable Trust and Grantham Foundation 
(8) https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/history
(9) https://wwf.panda.org/es/?226019/Local-actions-lay-the-groundwork-for-REDD-implementation-in-Kutai-Barat-Indonesia
(10) For example, according to the Programme Documentation, the Regional Council on Climate Change (Dewan Daerah Perubahan Iklim), is a “key partner” in the implementation of the REDD programme, adding that it has “significant experience” in the “management of donor development funding”. This Council was created in 2011 and consists strictly of governmental representatives, however itcould count on “substantial support” from TNC (see here). Possibly one result of the ´substantial support´ that the Council opened the door for NGO participation in 2017 and, thus, increasing influence of NGOs in the programme. Another example is the signing of agreements and MOUs between NGOs and  the provincial government, like WWF did in 2018 around the activity of measuring carbon, a key activity in any REDD programme. According to WWF, it is “the first online-based data cooperation model of calculating, monitoring, and reporting the carbon in Indonesia”
(11) https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/11/08/indonesia-receives-first-payment-for-reducing-emissions-in-east-kalimantan
(12) Provincial Government East Kalimantan, nr. 500-4/15008/EK from 10/10/2023 about ´Pembayaran Alokasi Insentif RBP  FCPF-CF Untuk Kelompok Masyarakat´.
(13) Ibid
(14) https://news.mongabay.com/2020/01/indonesia-capital-relocation-borneo-kalimantan-tycoons-coal-mining-pulpwood/
(15) PT Pari Coal, owned by Adaro International Pte Ltd , PT Mitra Megah Indoprima, and PT Alam Tri Abadi. PT Pari Coal was granted a 24,971-hectare, 30-year concession by the national government on 01/02/2024. The location is partly on the border of Central and East Kalimantan, in North Barito and in Mahakam Ulu Regency. Adaro's coal will be transported on a special road that passes through Geleo Asa Village in West Kutai district; a port is being built too to facilitate the transport on the Mahakam River.
(16) This includes two hydropower dam projects: one is a 1,375MW plant that will directly affect the Mentarang and Tumbuh rivers; this project is already under construction and has already removed communities that are partly indigenous; the second one is a 9,000MW dam on the Kayan river, and construction has yet to start. If completed, both projects would further worsen climate chaos, due to the greenhouse gases that would be emitted from the forest being submerged. In addition to providing electricity for the new capital, the electricity generated would also fuel another devastating project in the region that is impacting other communities: the Green Industrial Park in North Kalimantan. Likewise, the coastal area of West and Central Sulawesi is being dismantled to dredge rocks that will be used as building materials for various IKN infrastructure projects. And what the Indonesian government promises to be a 'smart' city, means a city driven by electric transport. This fuels the demand for minerals like nickel, which has been causing severe social and environmental violations and protests in East Indonesia, for example on Halmahera island.
(17) Sawit Watch, an organisation that monitors industrial oil palm plantations and their expansion in Indonesia, has observed a trend of oil palm expansion in recent years. Furthermore, it disagrees with official figures of the area covered by industrial oil palm plantations in East Kalimantan – which the Ministry of Agriculture estimates to be 1,287 million hectares. Sawit Watch estimates the area of oil palm plantations in East Kalimantan to be 3 million hectares (Report and Projection, Indonesian Palm Plantation 2023, Sawit Watch)
(18) https://www.aman.or.id/filemanager/files/surat_terbuka_perdagangan_karbon_2023_231013_120638.pdf
(19) https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/donor-participants
(20) https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/_web_world_bank_2023_fcpf_annual_report_r01.pdf
(21) https://www.wrm.org.uy/other-information/sign-on-statement-rspo-failing-to-eliminate-violence-and-destruction-from-the-industrial-palm-oil-sector

For almost 10 years, the Informal Alliance against the expansion of Industrial Monocultures in West and Central Africa has had an important role in connecting grassroots organisations and activists and strengthening the resistance against land grabbing and other attacks by oil palm and other plantation companies in the region.

Last November, community activists and grassroots organisations that are part of the Alliance, from 10 countries, gathered at their General Assembly to renew their commitment to the defence of ancestral lands and to keep resisting against neo colonial interests and the corporate takeover of communities’ lands.

See below the full declaration:

Gabon, November 2024

THE MOUILA DECLARATION
of the
Informal Alliance against the expansion o Industrial Monocultures

We, the 60 members gathered at the 6th General Assembly of the Informal Alliance against the expansion of Industrial Monoculture Plantations, in Mouila, Gabon from November 19 to 22, 2024, representing communities and organizations of Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Congo Brazaville, Liberia, Ghana, Congo Kinshasa, Ivory Coast and Uganda are deeply committed to the fight against land grabbing, particularly by tree plantation companies. LET US ADOPTE this Declaration which marks our conviction in the vital importance of the recognition and return to ancestral community land ownership in Africa, for the well-being of the first occupants.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT:
    • Ancestral lands are home to communities of people with traditional culture and knowledge of nature;
    • Women play a critical role in the defense of their ancestral lands and forests;
    • Community ancestral land in Africa has intrinsic worth and warrants respect regardless of it usefulness in habitants and humanity as a whole;
    • The natural wealth, rights and freedom to their land is being eroded this day at  a frantic and unprecedented  manner and rate because of delibrate harmful development policies clade in colonial legancy;
    • Ancestral community territories illegally occupied during colonial and post-colonial government regimes as concessions to corporations for business development violate the rights of the people and therefore, constitutes serious crimes against human, an illegality is an illegality regardless of the time they were committed;
 
WE FURTHER ACKNOWLEADGE THAT:
    • Post-colonial governments have failed in their responsibilities by giving true independence to the communities by prioritizing colonial interests by foreign agents by enacting neo-community laws to dislodged and robbed communities of their ancestral land using various opaque notions of national land and/or government land ownership;
    • The threats caused by the senseless acts of grabbing ancestral land and awarding them as concessions to business has brought untold hardship, violence and irreparable damage such loss of lives and biodiversity, entrenched poverty due loss of livelihoods and community property, early child pregnancy, and gender-based violence, etc.
    • African countries that got independence in the 1960s and 70s, today consider communities as belonging to the State and governments and sit in the comfort of their armchairs in faraway land to grant concessions to corporations without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of the true of the ancestral landowners.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO:
    • Promote and defend agroecological practices and food sovereignty as a form of resistance;
    • Facilitate the establishment of effective and efficient network of communities, activists and NGOs cooperating at local and international level to understand the strategies and tactics used by corporations to steal communities ancestral land and to develop further strategies and tactics to guide communities to stop land grabbing and recover previous illegal occupied land according to the Alliance objectives;
    • Develop mechanisms that permit all sectors of society, especially the longstanding local populations to nonviolently start the journey to assert their ancestral rights to land fondly referred to by some governments as national land and/or state own land, be partners in planning, establishment of initiative that add value to the ancestral land;
    • Strengthen nonviolent resistance education and provide training that will improve their ability to confront governments and corporations that want to take over their territories.
    • Strengthen education for nonviolent resistance and provide training that will improve their ability to confront governments and corporations that want to take over their territories.
    • Plead for the authorities to provide young people with access to land in rural areas, facilitate their training and support.

RECOGNIZING that action to protect the living riches and beauty of ancestral land depends, on the full commitment of the affected local people, WE PLEDGE OURSELVES to work wholeheartedly to implement the provisions of this Declaration.

EMPHASZING that the recognition of ancestral land is essential to sustaining human society and conserving our planet, WE INVITE THE MEMBERS AND FRIENDS OF THE ALLIANCE to convey this Declaration far and wide with the purpose of ensuring that the conclusions acre incorporated in daily activities.

Signatories:

    • Community members from Gabon
    • Musiru Divag de Fougamou Gabon
    • Institute of sustainable Agriculture, Grand Bassa county, Jogba clan, Liberia
    • Women’s Network Against Rural Plantations Injustice (WoNARPI), Sierra Leone
    • Alliance Uganda Chapter
    • Witness Radio, Uganda
    • Nature Cameroon
    • Synaparcam, Cameroon
    • COPACO, DRC
    • RADD, Cameroon
    • Struggle to Economize Future Environment (SEFE), Mundemba, Cameroon
    • CPPH, Cote d’Ivoire
    • Collectif des Ressortissants et Écologistes des Plateaux Bateke, Gabon
    • REFEB, Cote d’Ivoire    
    • YVE Ghana
    • JVE Côte d’Ivoire
    • Association Gulusenu du village Doubou, Gabon
    • Muyissi Environnement, Gabon
    • Komolo Agro Farmers Association Kiryandongo, Uganda
    • Ndagize julius, East African, Uganda
    • LOOK GREEN, CARE FOUNDATION, Nigeria
    • Association les Rassembleurs du Village Mboukou, Gabon
    • Joegba United Women Empowerment and Development Organization (JUWEDO), Liberia
    • COLLECTIF ADIAKE. Cote d’Ivoire
    • CNOP, Congo
    • Maloa, Sierra Leone
    • World Rainforest Movement
    • GRAIN